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ABSTRACT
Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events
(corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance). As a matter of law, this is not the case. This
leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used by the courts.
This paper shows that American standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an efficient
mechanism for implementing building projects given existing legal rules. It is shown that a central
feature of these contracts is the inclusion of governance covenants that shape the scope of authority,
and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties. Our model also implies that the legal remedies
of mistake, impossibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the
case of Hadley vs. Baxendale are efficient solutions to the problem of implementing complex exchange.
Surajeet Chakravarty
University of Exeter
s.chakravarty@exeter.ac.uk
W. Bentley MacLeod
Department of Economics
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street, MC 3308
New York, NY 10027
and NBER
bentley.macleod@columbia.edu
And other things of this sort should be known to architects, so that, before they begin upon
buildings, they may be careful not to leave disputed points for the householders to settle after the
works are finished, and so that in drawing up contracts the interests of both employer and contractor
may be wisely safe-guarded. For if a contract is skillfully drawn, each may obtain a release from
the other without disadvantage.
Vitruvius, “Ten Books on Architecture” , Chapter 1, Book 1, circa 1st Century B.C.
1. Introduction
There are several ways in which actual contracts vary from those portrayed in economic models.
First, economic models of contract typically assume that contracts are enforced as written (a legal
rule known as specific performance). In contrast, in the United States the common law rule for
breach of contract is that the court award damages for harm arising from the breach (the common
law rule of specific expectation damages).1 Second, economic models of contract are comprehensive
in that a contract is modeled as a function that specifies outcomes/actions for every relevant state
of the world. However, legally enforceable contracts are typically modular - they involve a great
deal of “boiler-plate” and only a few terms are modified to deal with special circumstances in the
relationship at hand.2 These differences between theory and practice imply that results obtained
from the theoretical economics literature on incomplete contracts may not be directly applicable to
many observed contracts.
It is generally recognized that contracts for the exchange of complex goods are necessarily incom-
plete. Building upon the insights of Williamson (1975), the early literature on contract incomplete-
ness has shown that the need to renegotiate a contract in the face of an unforeseen contingency my
lead to inefficient investment into relationship specific investments.3 However, it is difficult to tell
whether a particular observed contract is efficient or not. There is also a general presumption that
failure to enforce contracts as written (i.e. lack of specific performance) is likely to lead to inefficient
outcomes.4
In this paper, we follow Goldberg and Erickson’s (1987) suggestion that industry practice is a
useful starting point for understanding efficient contract design. We analyze the standard form
1See chapter 12 of Farnsworth (1999).
2See Kahan and Klausner (1997) for a nice discussion of the law of boilerplate.
3See Tirole (1999) for a critical review of this literature.
4See Schwartz (1979) for a seminal statement of this view, and Schwartz and Scott (2008) for an up to date account
of this argument.
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construction contracts developed by the American Institute of Architects (AIA). These forms are
used to allocate a large fraction of the resources devoted to construction in the United States,
currently about 9% of U.S. GDP.5
Our main result is that these contracts are an efficient mechanism for implementing complex
building projects in the “shadow” of American Law.6 A key feature of these contracts is the inclusion
of governance covenants that carefully allocate authority between the two parties, and limit the ex
post bargaining power of the parties. For example, the AIA has a set of forms that are used for
implementing an auction for the selection of a contractor. When a contractor wins, he knows that
he is the low bidder, and hence has an incentive to try to renegotiate an increase in the contract
price. The AIA forms address this problem by requiring bidders to post a bond that makes such
renegotiation difficult. Moreover, in addition to ensuring that the low cost seller is awarded the
contract, the auction also ensures that the buyer is the residual claimant to any future gains from
trade. This in turn ensures that the buyer makes efficient investments into planning and design.
AIA forms have many additional contractual instruments that allocate authority to either the buyer
or the seller as a function of the events that occur during of the construction project. Together the
various contractual instruments provided by the AIA forms use the law, as enforced in American
courts, to ensure the construction of complex projects at the lowest cost.
Our model also provides a rule for contract damages that is a function of the extent to which an
event is “foreseeable” or not. An implication of this rule is that it is optimal to excuse performance
in situations when an event is not foreseen. This result implies that the current excuses from
performance under American law are efficient damage rules. This includes the legal rule of “mistake,”
which can occur when one party did not understand an obligation, “impossibility”, an unforeseen
event occurs that makes performance impossible, and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen
events developed in the case of Hadley vs. Baxendale .
The agenda of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss the relationship of
this work to the literature. Section 3 outlines the procurement model we study and characterizes
the optimal allocation. Section 4 discusses several contractual instruments that are found in the
AIA form contracts, and show how together they implement the efficient allocation. In section 5, we
5Very similar contracts are used in other parts of the world. See Odams (1995).
6Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) introduced the idea that contract renegotiation (divorce agreements in their case)
typically occur outside the courtroom, but in the “shadow of the law”. In our case, the AIA contract shapes ex post
renegotiation taking into account the limits of legal enforceability.
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show that our model provides a rule for contract damages that can explain several of the of excuses
from performance of a contract as efficient default rules. The final section of the paper contains a
concluding discussion.
2. Relationship to the Literature.
The early literature on incomplete contracts, including Rogerson (1984), Grout (1984), Hart
and Moore (1988) and Tirole (1986), supposes that in states where a contract is incomplete or
inefficient, parties play a renegotiation game that leads to ex post efficient allocations at the cost of
providing inadequate incentives to make relationship specific investments.7 In addition to providing
a coherent model of contract incompleteness, this literature makes precise Williamson (1975)’s
insight that contract incompleteness can lead to inefficient allocations. Bajari and Tadelis (2001)
introduce a clever way to endogenize contract incompleteness based upon the idea that planning
for the future is a relationship specific investment that affects the probability that a contract has a
clear performance obligation for any realized state of the world. Taking the renegotiation game as
given, and assuming the legal rule of specific performance, they show that the choice between a fixed
price and cost plus contract depends upon the trade-off best the ex ante cost of planning and the ex
post benefit in reduced costs of renegotiation. Tirole (2009) uses this idea to build an elegant and
comprehensive model of incomplete contracts that provides predictions regarding contract duration,
and the extent to which relational contracts are optimally incomplete.
Another line of the literature explores the conditions under which one has efficient contracting.
Chung (1991) and Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994), building upon the general results of Moore
and Repullo (1988), show that if one has the rule of specific performance available, then one can
achieve the first best with a contract regulates the ex post bargaining power of parties through the
appropriate manipulation of the default terms. Maskin and Tirole (1999) show that renegotiation
design can ensure efficient even though goods are complex in that they cannot be described ex ante.
Recently, Evans (2008) has shown that one can achieve efficient investment and trade in a model
with simple contracts and an infinite horizon bargaining model.
There is also a literature on legal defaults that asks the question - how should the law set damages
when a contract terms are missing or incomplete? The early work by Shavell (1984) and Rogerson
7See Che and Hausch (1999) for a rather general model illustrating the point that contract incompleteness leads to
inefficient allocations. Similarly, Segal (1999) shows that contract complexity implies that parties choose a simple,
but inefficient, fixed price contract.
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(1984) considers the three legal rules that the courts might use in setting damages: expectation
damages (the pecuniary value the harmed parted expected from performance), reliance damages
(the costs borne by the harmed party from entering into an agreement) and specific performance
(an order to the defendant to perform as promised). They find that in general none of these rules
achieve the first best, though specific performance is generally preferred to the other rules. Edlin
and Reichelstein (1996) show that specific performance can ensure efficient trade, but expectation
damages cannot achieve an efficiency allocation in their model.
The paper most related to our work is MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) who provide an early result
on efficient contracting in the shadow of the law. The goal of that paper is explore how the holdup
model can explain many features of observed contracts, such as wage and price rigidity. The model
provides a explanation for Joskow (1988)’s puzzling observations regarding long term coal contracts.
Joskow found that these contracts often have complex indexing provisions that ensure that contract
price tracks the market price for coal. The puzzle then is why have a contract at all rather than
simply use the market price? MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) show that the combination of the
US law limiting the use of specific performance and the need to provide incentives to both parties
to make relationship specific investments yields a contract with exactly this form that implements
the first best.8 Thus, even though the law constrains the set of feasible contracts, parties are still
able to find contractual instruments that implement the efficient allocation.
This paper extends these results to the case of complex exchange exemplified by large construction
projects. In this case, simple indexed contracts are not sufficient to implement an efficient allocation.
Rather, efficiency is achieved with a complex combination of contractual instruments. Our results
also illustrate that in contract design one must be cautious before concluding that expectation
damages necessarily lead to an inefficient allocation, as the literature had thus far concluded.
3. A Model of Procurement
Consider a risk neutral buyer who wishes to contract with one of several potential risk neutral
sellers for the supply of a project that entails significant relationship specific investments by the
selected seller.9 The key ingredients of the procurement process are as follows:
8See proposition 6 or MacLeod and Malcomson (1993).
9See Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) for a discussion of why contracts are needed in the presence of relationship
specific investment. See also Hart and Moore (1988).
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(1) The preference ordering of the buyer over project characteristics is private information.
Hence, the buyer must be induced to voluntarily reveal her most preferred project given the
cost.
(2) Investment into planning by the buyer is assumed to be observable by the potential sellers,
but not contractible. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) observe that project design provides a
‘concrete’ example of a relationship specific investment that is observable by both parties
ex post, but cannot be explicitly contracted upon (Grossman and Hart (1986)). It is well
known in the construction industry that contractors use information on the quality of project
design when setting their bids.10
(3) Following Laffont and Tirole (1986) it is assumed that the ex post cost of production is
observed, but not the ex ante investment by the seller into cost reduction.
(4) The project is complex, in that it is built up from a set of components, such as the foundations
of a building, the window frames, the roof, electrical system, etc. This complexity implies
that the design is incomplete in two dimensions. First, it may be necessary to change the
specifications of a component ex post. Second, the buyer may wish to add components or
elements to the project that were not anticipated at the time the contract was signed.
Providing a precise definition of complexity is difficult, and certainly controversial. Here we follow
the literature and use the notion of complexity in two senses. The first notion is due to Bajari and
Tadelis (2001). Their insight is to recognize that investment in design affects the probability that
the buyer will desire a change to the specifications of a project component. For example, one might
realize that a paint color does not look quite right once applied, and after construction begins to
request a color change. This change might have been avoided if the buyer had spent more time
building prototypes of the project. The key feature of the Bajari and Tadelis (2001) model is that
the investments into design are observed by the seller, hence the seller can anticipate the likelihood
of a design change ex post.
A project may also be complex because the buyer may require the addition of components to the
project that were unforeseen at the time of the design. In the case of the Getty Museum in Los
Angeles, the Northridge earthquake occurred during construction. From this event, the builders
learned that they had to make substantial changes to the structure. Given that earthquakes are
10We thank George Lefcoe for pointing this out to us.
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common to Los Angeles, the possibility of an earthquake was not unforeseen. The real issue is that
it is costly to learn the detailed consequences of such an event. In this case, what was unforeseen
is the incompleteness of their knowledge regarding the effect of an earthquake upon the existing
structure. Accordingly, we explicitly model unforeseen events as a form of learning regarding one’s
true preferences over project specifications.
Given that both the buyer and the seller have made relationship specific investments, it is cheaper
to have the current seller carry out any unforeseen modifications. However, due to the asymmetric
information that may exist between the buyer and seller, this may lead to inefficient ex post rene-
gotiation. In addition, given the design, the seller can make non-contractible relationship specific
investments that reduce production costs. The goal of the contract between the two parties is to
ensure efficient investment into both the design and the execution of the project.
The next subsection provides a time-line for the model, followed by a detailed description of each
step.
The Time-Line for the Procurement Process. The procurement process is divided into three
major stages: ex ante, interim and ex post. The ex ante stage encompasses the initial planning of the
project and the selection of a suitable seller. The interim stage consists of a sequence of actions by
the seller to carry out the construction of the project, while the ex post stage entails the final settling
up of payments, including possible litigation. The next subsection provides a characterization of
the optimal allocation subject to the informational constraints of the environment. The time line
for the procurement process is as follows:
(1) Ex Ante Stage
(a) Buyer invests d into planning for the design of a component tc.
(b) Two sellers bid for the project described by characteristic qc that includes a mechanism
for the governance of future design changes.
(c) The low cost bid is selected.
(2) Interim Stage
(a) Seller invests e into cost reduction, and cost c ∈ {cL, cH} of construction is realized.
(b) Buyer receives new information and design is changed to Q = {qc, qu}, where qu is a
new component to be added that was not anticipated at the design stage.
(c) Seller builds the project.
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(3) Ex Post Stage
(a) Agreed upon payments are made, resulting in a net payment P from the buyer to the
seller.
(b) Any remaining disputes are resolved (in court if necessary).
Investment
into
Design
Investment
into Cost
Reduction
Cost Shock
Realized
Preference
Shocks
Project
Implemented
CL
CH
z = 1
z = 0
q = 1
   
q = 0
q = 1
q = 0
z = 1
z = 0
q = 1
q = 0
q = 1
q = 0
Surplus
u(1,1) - CH
u(1,0) -  CH
u(0,1) -  C^
u(1,1) - CL
u(1,0) -  CL
u(0,0) -  C^
u(0,1) -  C^
u(0,0) -  C^
d e
Figure 3.1. Time Line of Decisions and Events
Ex Ante Stage .
At step 1 (a) the buyer invests into project design by hiring an architect or engineer at a fixed
cost AB. The project, whether it is a building, a bridge, or a weapons system, is built from a
set of components, each of which have a well defined specification. Let T = {1, ..., N} denote the
set of possible components, where t is a typical component. This might be a type of door, along
with a specification of the type of wood to be used and the finish. However, there is always some
uncertainty regarding design. For example, a building project might specify door handles, but fail
to specify the model or color.11 The uncertainty due to design leads to two ways in which the
11This example came from a discussion with a building contractor.
8
existing contract may have to be changed later. First, an existing component specification may be
changed. Second, an additional component may be added on to the existing set of components.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that the initial design consists of a single component tc.
This is the initial scope of the project. Both parties recognize that the specifications determining the
characteristics of this component may change during the interim stage. We denote the implemented
foreseen component by qc ∈ {0, 1} , where qc = 1 denotes that the component is executed as
originally designed, while qc = 0 denotes a change to the original design. Changes in the design can
occur because of shocks to the buyer’s preferences or due to the realized cost of implementation.
These shocks are observed after the seller has made relationship specific investments, but before the
project is implemented. The shock to the buyer’s preferences is denoted by z ∈ {0, 1} , where z = 1
means that the original design is preferred, while z = 0 implies that the buyer would like to change
the specification of the component. The buyer’s payoff from this component is u(qc, z). The cost of
implementing the specified design is detailed in the next section.
The likelihood of a design change ex post is a function of the buyer’s investment into design, given
by d ≥ 0. The probability that z = 1 is given by ρ(d). It is assumed that without any planning there
is a 50% chance the buyer will change her mind (ρ(0) = 1/2), while an increased investment into
planning reduces the likelihood of a design change - formally, ρ′ > 0, ρ′′ < 0 and limd→∞ρ(d) = 1.
It is assumed that the sellers can observe d before bidding for a contract.
In addition, at the time the contract is written, the buyer anticipates that she may wish to add
a component tu to the project, though both the nature and value of the component are unknown
ex ante.12 She will learn both the nature of the component and its utility, uu, during the period of
project implementation. The seller cannot observe uu. Let qu = 1 if an unforeseen component is
added to the project, and qu = 0 otherwise.
At stage 1(b) the potential sellers are given the design characterized by {tc, qc, d}, along with the
conditions of the procurement contract. They make production plans and bid for the right to carry
out the project using the selection mechanism designed by the buyer. Let ASi > 0 be seller i’s fixed
cost of production, i = 1, 2 . This fixed cost is the only source of variation between the two sellers.
Moreover, it is assumed that ex ante these costs are independently distributed across sellers and
12One could put this into a more formal Bayesian framework with a large space of possible components, all having
equal ex ante probability of being added. When this space is sufficiently large, there is no benefit from adding
conditions for specific components. See MacLeod (2002) and Segal (1999) for formal models of this effect.
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unobserved to the buyer, and satisfy the regularity condition of Myerson (1981). This ensures that
a Vickrey auction with a reserve price is the efficient mechanism for choosing a seller.13 Finally, at
stage 1(c) the buyer selects the winner of the Vickrey auction.
Interim Stage
At stage 2(a) the selected seller makes an investment e into cost reduction. This determines the
probability ρ(e) ∈ (12 , 1) that the cost c of completing a foreseen component is c = cL, otherwise
the cost is c = cH . For simplicity, we use the same function, ρ(.), for the buyer’s planning costs.
This latter assumption saves on notation and can easily be relaxed. Should the parties agree to
have the design changed (qc = 0) then the expected cost is assumed to be cˆ ≡ (cH + cL)/2. Let
∆c = cH − cˆ = cˆ − cL parametrize the size of the potential cost savings arising from the efforts of
the seller. We assume that ex post cost c is observed, as it is a feature of all the standard form
construction contracts that the seller has an obligation to keep good records that establish the cost
of production.
At stage 2(b), after the seller’s investment, the buyer realizes a shock to her preferences. She
learns z ∈ {0, 1} that determines whether she prefers the component tc to be executed as originally
planned (qc = 1) or whether she prefers a change (qc = 0). In addition, the buyer may realize a
value, uu, at a cost, cu, from the addition of an unforeseen component tu. The state of the project
just before it is realized is given by ω = {z, c, uu, cu}. Recall that both z and uu are assumed to be
unobserved by the seller and the courts. Let qu = 1 if the component tu is added to the contract,
and zero otherwise.
Finally, at stage 2(c) the project Q = {qc, qu} is realized.
Ex Post Stage
This is the final settling up stage. Without pecuniary transfers, the payoffs to the buyer and
seller given the state, ω, and the realized project, Q(ω), are:
UB(ω,Q, d, e) = u(qc, z) + quuu − d−AB,
USi (ω,Q, d, e) = −cˆ− qc (c− cˆ)− qucu − e−ASi .
13See page 66, expression 5.1 of Myerson (1981). In addition to assuming the values are independent, the regularity
condition adds a monotonicity condition that ensures the existence of an efficient solution under a Vickrey auction.
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At stage 3(a) the contract terms, including any renegotiated price, determine the monetary
transfer between the buyer and the seller. At stage 3(b) parties may choose to file a lawsuit. This
may result in additional payments between the parties that are determined at that time. Let P
denote the net transfer; then the exchange concludes with the buyer and seller realizing their final
payoffs UB (ω,Q, d, e)− P and USi (ω,Q, d, e) + P , respectively.
The Efficient Allocation. An allocation is a choice of seller, a project plan, and a set of investment
levels, denoted pi = {i, Q(ω), e, d}, where pi ∈ Π and Π is the set of feasible allocations. An allocation
pi∗ = {i∗, Q∗(ω), e∗, d∗} is efficient if it maximizes the social surplus:
E {Si (ω,Q(ω), d, e)} = E
{
UB (ω, d) + USi (ω, e)
}
.
Let us assume that the preferences of the buyer (z and uu) are observable. Given that there
are a finite number of potential sellers and that the probability function ρ(.) is continuous, it is
straightforward to show that an efficient solution exists. The remainder of this section characterizes
this optimal solution as a function of model parameters and provides some comparative statics
results. We also show how the efficient project design Q∗(ω) = {q∗(ω), qu∗(ω)} can be implemented
under the assumption that the buyer’s preferences are not observed.
Unforeseen Components. Consider first the implementation of unforeseen components. At stage
2(b) the buyer learns whether she would like to add component tu that has value uu. Under the
assumption that costs are observable, the buyer asks the seller to produce a binding estimate cu
for the cost of the component. It is efficient to add this component to the project if and only if
uu ≥ cu. Thus, the efficient action qu∗(ω) ∈ {0, 1} is defined by qu∗(ω) = 1 if and only if uu ≥ cu,
otherwise the component is not built.
Foreseen Components. Consider now the decision of whether or not to change the foreseen compo-
nent. Given the preference shock z, it is efficient to keep the original design if and only if :
u(1, z)− u(0, z) ≥ c− cˆ. (3.1)
The cost difference satisfies c − cˆ = ±∆c depending upon whether the realized costs are either
high or low. Let ∆uz = u(z, z) − u(1 − z, z) > 0 denote the gains to the buyer from choosing her
preferred design given her preference shock z. The analysis is significantly simplified if we suppose
11
that the marginal gain from altering the design to her preferred design is independent of z, thus we
let:
∆u = ∆u1 = ∆u0 > 0.
The optimal design of component tc is a function of {∆c,∆u} and is fully characterized by two
cases:
1. If ∆u ≥ ∆c, then the foreseen component is buyer biased and the optimal design satisfies:
q∗ (ω) =

1 if z = 1,
0 if z = 0.
2. If ∆u < ∆c then the foreseen component is seller biased and the optimal design satisfies:
q∗ (ω) =

1 if c = cL,
0 if c = cH .
Observe that even in the presence of asymmetric information, a simple governance structure can
ensure ex post efficiency. Suppose that the price does not vary with the choice of design. In that
case efficient design can be implemented by giving the control right over the choice of qc to the
buyer when a component is buyer biased, and to the seller when it is a seller biased component.
This mechanism ensures ex post efficiency, though this does not necessarily lead to ex ante efficient
investment. Given efficient ex post production, we now characterize the optimal planning and cost
reducing investment levels for the cases of buyer biased and seller biased components.
Buyer Biased Components. Under the assumption that the efficient project is always implemented,
the social surplus from a buyer biased component (∆u ≥ ∆c) as a function of planning d and effort
e is:14
SB(d, e) = u(0, 0)− cˆ+ (F (d) + 1) (u(1, 1)− u(0, 0) + F (e)∆c) /2− d− e, (3.2)
where
F (x) = 2ρ (x)− 1 (3.3)
14This is derived using the expected ex post gains from trade:
ρ(d) {ρ(e)(u(1, 1)− cL) + (1− ρ(e))(u(1, 1)− cH)}+ (1− ρ(d))(u(0, 0)− cˆ).
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is a measure of the foreseeability. When x = 0 then F (x) = 0, corresponding to an unforeseeable
outcome - z = 0 and z = 1 are equally likely. As x increases then F (x) approaches 1, and which
design will be efficient is more predictable.
By assumption, the foreseeability function is strictly concave, and hence if it is efficient to have
some planning the unique investment levels are characterized by:
F ′ (d∗) =
2
∆u∗ + F (e∗) ∆c
, (3.4)
F ′ (e∗) =
2
(F (d∗) + 1)∆c
, (3.5)
where ∆u∗ = u(1, 1) − u(0, 0) ≥ 0 is the difference between the utility the buyer receives when
she prefers no design change and this is implemented, and if she wishes a design change and this
is implemented. Notice that investment in planning and in cost reduction are complements - an
increase in planning, d, increases the benefit from investing in cost reduction and vice-verso. The
marginal impact of planning upon foreseeability at zero investment is F ′(0), and is assumed to be
strictly positive.
Notice that a smaller ∆u∗ corresponds to a smaller gain from ensuring that the buyer does not
wish to change her mind, and hence to a smaller gain from planning. In particular, if this gain and
∆c are sufficiently small then it is efficient to engage in no planning and make no effort into cost
reduction. Conversely, for large enough gain from planning, depending on cost savings, it is efficient
to invest in planning and cost reduction, d∗, e∗ > 0, or in planning only d∗ > 0, e∗ = 0. These
results are summarized in the following proposition, whose proof is in the appendix:
Proposition 1. Suppose a component is buyer biased (∆u ≥ ∆c), then the first order conditions
imply:
(1) If F ′(0) < 24u∗+4c then is no investment: d
∗ = 0 and e∗ = 0;
(2) If 14c ≥ F ′(0) > 24u∗ there is strictly positive optimal planning, d∗ > 0, and no cost reducing
effort, e∗ = 0;
(3) If F ′(0) > max( 24c ,
2
4u∗ ) then investment into planning and cost reduction is strictly posi-
tive, d∗ > 0 and e∗ > 0.
When the total gain to planning and cost reduction, as measured by 4u∗ + ∆c, is small then it
does not pay to plan. In this case, there would be no benefit to a long term contract. Conversely,
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when the gain to planning, 4u∗, and gain to cost reduction, ∆c, are both sufficiently large, then it
is efficient for both parties to make relationship specific investments. We consider next the case of
a seller biased component, defined by ∆c > ∆u, where it is always efficient to modify the design in
the face of an adverse cost shock.
Seller Biased Components. For a seller biased component (∆c > ∆u) the efficient design always
entails choosing the low cost option. In this case, the expected ex post surplus is given by:
SS = (u(0, 0) + u(1, 1) + ∆c−∆u)/2− cˆ
+ F (e)∆c/2 + F (d) (∆u∗ + F (e)∆u) /2− d− e.
Hence, the first order conditions for planning and effort when they are positive are given by:
F ′(d∗) =
2
∆u∗ + F (e∗)∆u
, (3.6)
F ′(e∗) =
2
∆c+ F (d∗)∆u
. (3.7)
As before, the first order conditions uniquely determine design and effort when design and effort
are positive.
Proposition 2. In the case of the seller-biased component (4c > 4u), we have:
(1) If F ′(0) <min( 24u∗+4u ,
2
4c+4u) there is no investment at all, d
∗ = 0, e∗ = 0;
(2) If 24c < F
′(0) < 24u∗+4u there is investment into cost reduction, e
∗ > 0, and no planning,
d∗ = 0;
(3) If 24u∗ < F
′(0) < 24c+4u , there is investment into planning, d
∗ > 0, and no cost reducing
investment, e∗ = 0;
(4) If F ′(0) > max( 24u∗ ,
2
4c) there is investment into both planning and cost reduction, d
∗ > 0
and e∗ > 0.
As with buyer biased components, investments into planning and cost reduction are complementary.
Case 1 also illustrates that if the gain from planning is sufficiently small, then there is no investment
in planning nor cost reduction. Moreover, variations in the benefit to planning itself, without an
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increase in the actual amount of planning, have no effect on cost reducing activities. This illustrates
the point that planning is an essential input into cost reduction.
Summary. An efficient project is characterized by an optimal amount of planning into the design
by the buyer that in turn guides the investment into cost reduction by the seller. The amount of
investment into planning by the seller and cost reduction by the buyer depends upon the extent of
the potential cost savings. In general, investment into planning and cost reduction are complements
for both buyer biased and seller biased components. For complex projects, there are inevitably
components that have been left out of the original design, and for which parties have not made
relationship specific investments15. These unforeseen components should be added whenever the
benefit exceeds the cost.
4. Efficient Contractual Instruments
In this section we discuss the contractual instruments, supplied by the AIA form contracts, that
implement the efficient allocation, given the legal remedies that are supplied by US courts. The
first stage entails choosing the contract for the choice of the contractor. The second stage entails
the implementation of the project, which includes applying the governance terms provided by the
ex ante agreement.
Our model builds upon the model of Bajari and Tadelis (2001), but modifies the set of contractual
instruments to be more consistent with the AIA form contracts. Bajari and Tadelis suppose that
the buyer invests in observable planning that determines the likelihood that the project design is
incomplete, and must be renegotiated for the buyer to obtain a value v. After the investment
into planning, the seller makes an unobserved cost reducing investment. If the design needs to be
changed ex post, it is assumed that the cost of this change is not observed by the buyer. It is further
assumed that the contract merely specifies the form of compensation, cost plus or fixed price, not
the renegotiation protocol. Hence, at the time the contract is renegotiated one has a situation
of asymmetric information combined with ex post renegotiation. As a consequence, the first best
cannot be achieved.
In contrast, we have assumed that costs are observable. This is not only consistent with the
early work on procurement by Laffont and Tirole (1986), it is also consistent with the requirement
15Hart (1990) makes the point that if an event is not foreseen, then this cannot affect the level of relationship specific
investment.
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that any damages can depend only upon observed costs - the contractor is obliged under the AIA
contracts to maintain good accounting records so that the costs of production can be verified. It is
also a standard rule in contract law that a contractor has a duty to mitigate any losses - namely
they should find the low cost method for achieving performance, and cannot claim for costs when
there was an obviously less expensive way to achieve performance.16
We do assume that the preferences of the buyer are not observable - an assumption that seems
particularly appropriate in construction where it would be very difficult for the courts to place
monetary value upon aesthetic elements of buildings. If one supposes that both parties share in
the surplus from renegotiation, then this still implies inefficient exchange ex post. However, if the
informed party has all the ex post bargaining power, then one can achieve the efficient allocation.17
This is consistent with the structure of the AIA contracts for which the default rule on question of
design is to allocate all ex post authority to the buyer.
This does not however ensure that one can achieve efficient ex ante investment incentives. In
fact, the point of Hart and Moore (1988) and Tirole (1986) is to show that in general one does not
achieve efficient investment, even if renegotiation is efficient. In the mechanism design literature,
the closest case is the partially private information situation considered by Rogerson (1992), who
shows that an abstract mechanism can achieve the efficient allocation with one-sided relationship
specific investment ex ante and one-sided asymmetric information ex post.18 When information is
symmetric, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) show that one can simultaneously obtain effi-
cient investment by both buyer and seller, and ensure efficient ex post trade if parties are able to
appropriately allocate bargaining power during the renegotiation phase.
All these mechanisms, including the contracts in Bajari and Tadelis (2001), assume that the
courts use the doctrine of specific performance. Moreover, there is a general presumption in the
literature that under the rule of expectation damages, when ex post renegotiation is possible, parties
cannot write a contract that achieves an efficient allocation, as formally shown by Rogerson (1984)
and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996).
16See chapter 12 of Farnsworth (1999).
17Crémer and McLean (1988) demonstrate this in an abstract mechanism design setting. Kanemoto and MacLeod
(1992) show in an employment context that efficiency can be achieved in such a setting with the appropriate allocation
of bargaining power to the informed employee.
18See proposition 6 of Rogerson 1992.
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We shall show that it is possible to achieve an efficient allocation even though parties are limited
to expectation damages. There are two reasons why we obtain different results from the previous
literature. First, the literature typically assumes that the information structure is given. In practice,
the amount of information available is a choice variable. For example, construction contracts require
sellers to provide detailed information regarding costs to estimate an appropriate damage award.
Second, the efficiency result of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994) supposes that ex post
bargaining power is allocated to one or the other party. In contrast, the AIA form contracts split
authority as a function of the nature of the task. Tasks that affect the nature of the final product
are under the exclusive control of the buyer, while tasks affecting costs of production, such as the
methods used for construction, are under the exclusive control of the seller. These correspond to
what we have called buyer biased and seller biased tasks. We shall show that once authority is
divided in this way, it is possible to design a contract that provides incentives for efficient planning
and cost reduction, while ensuring that renegotiation always results in an ex post efficient allocation
under the rule of expectation damages.
The AIA forms are not a single contract, but a collection of contractual instruments that are
combined as a function of the project needs, to provide a comprehensive agreement. We proceed by
describing the appropriate contractual instrument for each stage of the procurement process, and
then showing how together they implement the efficient allocation.
Ex Ante: Choice of Seller. Contractors are typically selected by some form of sealed-bid auction.
Normally, the owner chooses the lowest bid, although they have the legal right to choose any
bidder they wish, and often they do not choose the lowest bid.19 The reason is that some sellers
may be either technically or financially incapable of executing the project, and hence may make
unrealistically low bids. This problem is addressed by requiring bidders to pre-qualify. The bidding
then occurs among the qualified bidders.
The standard economic rationale for the use of a bidding procedure is to reveal the seller with the
lowest cost of supplying the good (see McAfee and McMillan (1987)). For complex procurement,
Goldberg (1977) has informally argued that auctions also provide an opportunity to communicate
information to the sellers. We formalize this insight, and show that the use of an auction plays an
important role in providing the buyer with the appropriate incentives to invest in planning, and
19Universal By-Products Inc. v City of Modesto (1974), 43 CA3d 145. The city of Modesto was sued for not granting
the contract to the lowest bidder. The court ruled in favor of the city.
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thereby solves a significant source of holdup. Under the hypothesis that the quality of the design
is observable, investment into planning the design then results in lower bids by prospective sellers.
This in turn provides the buyer with first best incentives to invest into the design of the project.
More formally, suppose that the buyer chooses a contract k ∈ K and investment into the design
d. Given this information, sellers offer to carry out the project for a base price P . In addition, the
contract k has clauses that allow additional transfers T to occur that are a function of events that
occur as the project is implemented. Suppose that there are two potential sellers, i ∈ {1, 2}, whose
payoffs are assumed to be given by:
USi (k, d, P ) = E
{
USi (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e
∗(k, d)) + T (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e∗(k, d))|k, d}+ P.
The buyer’s payoff is given by:
UB (k, d, P ) = E
{
UB (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e∗(k, d))− T (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e∗(k, d))|k, d}− P.
In both cases Q(ω, k) is the realized design chosen under the contract given the state ω, while e(k, d)
is the effort chosen by the seller as a function of the contract and the amount of planning, d. The
additional transfer required by the contract is denoted by T (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e∗(k, d)).
In this model, the only asymmetric information among the sellers is their privately observed fixed
cost of doing the project. Under the regularity condition of Myerson (1981), a second price auction
ensures that the seller with the lowest cost is selected:
Proposition 3. If the buyer allocates the project to the winner of the second price auction then
P = −USi (k, d, P ) + δ,
where δ =
∣∣AS1 −AS2 ∣∣ > 0 is the difference in the bids (there are only two bidders). This is the
lowest price the buyer can obtain conditional upon design d and contract k. Given this equilibrium,
the buyer chooses k, i and d to solve:
maxk∈K,d≥0,i∈IE {Si (ω, d, e(k, d)) |k, d} . (4.1)
These results follow from the observation that in the second price auction it is optimal for the
seller to bid a price P that makes him indifferent between participating or not. Given that the only
variation among sellers is the fixed cost of participation, and that the winning seller is paid the
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second lowest price, then the winning seller receives his valuation USi plus the rent δ = A
S
i′ − ASi .
Given that the rent is independent of the contract offered and the investment into design, and given
that for each contract offered by the buyer, there exists a well defined expected payoff to the seller,
the buyer will choose the contract k ∈ K and design d that maximizes the expected social surplus,
as given by (4.1). Note that from the revenue equivalence theorem, as long as the fixed costs ASi
are independently distributed across sellers, then a first price auction would also yield the same
expected price and payoff.20
At this point we do not prove that a solution to (4.1) exists. We demonstrate this by construction
- we show that there is a contract that is built up from contractual instruments that correspond to
clauses in AIA form contracts, and that together these instruments implement the first best.
An essential ingredient for a successful auction is that once a winner has been selected, the winner
will in fact proceed to carry out the contract under the agreed upon terms. One problem is that
the winner now knows that he supplied the lowest bid, and might attempt to renegotiate the price
terms. In addition, once the project has begun, the substantial sunk investments may lead the seller
to try and holdup the buyer for better terms.
The AIA form contracts have several contractual instruments that explicitly address this issue.
Form A701 provides instructions to bidders. To deal with the threat of non-performance, contractors
are required to post bonds, as detailed in forms A310 and A312. Form A310 is the bid bond that
ensures that the winning seller does not renege upon their bid. Form A312 contains two bonding
provisions. There is a payment bond that ensures that subcontractors are paid when the contractor
does not pay them, to avoid subcontractors imposing a mechanic’s lien against the building.21 The
second part is a performance bond. This bond ensures that should the contractor not complete the
job, there are sufficient funds available to find another contractor who will be able to complete the
work.22
Under form A312 the courts would never be asked to enforce performance per se. If a dispute
arises and there is stoppage of work by the contractor, the buyer would ask the bonding company to
20See Myerson (1981).
21These liens are covered by state and local law, and provide a simple way for contractors to ensure that they are
paid for work completed. In practice, this usually means that, if the property is sold, the lien holders can make a
claim against the purchase price before the original owner is paid.
22The first clause of A312 states: “The contractor and the Surety, jointly and severally, bind themselves, their heir,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns to the Owner for the performance of the Construction Contract,
which is incorporated herein by reference.”
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provide the funds to complete the work. Should the bonding company refuse to pay, the buyer would
recover damages from the bonding company under the rule of expectation damages. Note how the
introduction of a bond effectively ensures specific performance even though the courts limit damages
to expectations. This is because the bond explicitly states that it will pay for work should the original
contractor default, and hence the value of expectations is the cost of the work, and not the value
to the buyer. Thus, the bond effectively releases the need for the courts to measure performance,
but rather the courts enforce (via expectation damages) a sequence of monetary transfers.
The AIA contracts also provide protection to the contractor from the buyer. Buyers are required
to make payments as work proceeds as a function of the contractor’s costs. Hence, the amounts
owed to the contractor at any point in time are limited, with the contract carefully structured so
that bargaining power can be reallocated between the parties as a function of who is in breach of
the contract.
Interim Performance. In this section we discuss the contractual instruments that ensure the
efficient implementation of the different types of components in the project - those unforeseen
at the time the contract is signed, seller biased foreseen components, and buyer biased foreseen
components. If the only goal were to ensure ex post efficiency then, as discussed in section 2, there
are simple governance structures that implement the efficient design. The issue is more complex
due to the interaction between the unobserved investment into cost reduction by the seller and
the unobserved preferences of the buyer. For each type of component, we show that there exists a
contractual instrument that implements the efficient allocation. Moreover, each instrument has an
analogue in the AIA form contracts. This is consistent with the hypothesis that these forms are an
efficient solution to the procurement problem in the shadow of the law.
Unforeseen Components. Suppose there are additional components that are desired by the buyer
that were unforeseen at the time plans were created, and for which the incumbent seller, already
on site, is the most efficient supplier (least cost) of the new component. In this case, the seller may
holdup the buyer and attempt to extract a rent from the buyer in return for providing the new
component. Given that the buyer’s preferences are not observed, this rent extraction may lead to a
social loss.23
23Namely, modifications whose true costs are less than their value to the buyer might not be implemented.
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Given that costs are assumed to be observable, then the first best is achieved if the buyer has
the right to make changes as she wishes, with the only obligation being that she compensates the
seller for additional costs. This is precisely the solution suggested by article 7 of AIA form A201.
Normally, changes to a project are carried out via change orders, as specified by article 7.2 of A201-
1997. A change order consists of details of how the project is to be modified, and an agreement on
the price for the the change. Normally, the buyer has an architect acting on her behalf who is well
versed in what are likely to be reasonable costs. Moreover, by being a written document produced
by design professionals it is intended to provide a clear statement of the seller’s obligation that, if
necessary, can be verified by a court.
This, combined with the requirement that the seller must produce detailed accounts, implies
that we may suppose that the buyer is informed of the true cost of the change, and then decides
whether or not it should be implemented. Once the order has been issued, it then becomes a binding
obligation for the seller. More formally, the change order instrument is defined as follows:
COI: Change Order Instrument:
(1) The buyer requests a new component, qu = 1.
(2) The seller reports the verifiable cost cu.
(3) The buyer then decides whether or not to proceed.
(4) If the buyer decides to proceed, the seller agrees to supply the component and the price
P is adjusted upwards by cu.
This contractual instrument corresponds to a cost plus contract under which the seller agrees to
carry out the requests of the buyer, and in return is reimbursed for out of pocket costs.
Proposition 4. The change order instrument results in the addition of a component with value uu
if and only if uu ≥ cu. Moreover, this instrument efficiently implements any foreseeable component
for which efficient effort is zero (e = 0.)
Observe that if there is no benefit from planning, then it is efficient to use a cost plus contract
even if the component is foreseen (as observed by Bajari and Tadelis (2001)). Here we have supposed
that the costs are easily observable, and agreed upon by both parties.
Change orders are typically achieved via mutual agreement between the buyer and the seller.
Given that the incumbent seller is on site, and thus the low cost supplier, she may attempt to
extract a price from the buyer that is greater than cost. If anticipated by the buyer, this would
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lead to an over investment into design. The question then, is even though the buyer has both the
authority and the right to make changes ex post at cost, how does one limit opportunistic behavior
by the seller?
If the seller does, in the opinion of the buyer, attempt to extort an unreasonable price then the
buyer may elect to use a change order directive. This is a contractual instrument provided by the
AIA forms under which the seller is ordered or directed to carry out a task before an agreement
on price has been reached. As long as the changes are within the scope of the project, the seller
has an obligation to complete the requested changes or be in breach of contract. This removes the
ability of the seller to threaten with a delay, which can greatly increase construction costs.24 The
COD reduces the ability of the seller to extract an excessively high price for such changes. He
must comply with the directive, or face a penalty. This power is further reinforced by the bonding
form A312 that gives the buyer the right to seize all equipment and material on the site for the
completion of building should the seller refuse to complete the work.25 The seller is still protected
because he may ask the courts for additional compensation to cover any costs of compliance with
the directive.
More formally this contractual instrument is defined as follows:
COD: Change Order Directive:
(1) The buyer requests a new component, qu = 1.
(2) The seller produces the component and submits the verifiable cost cu.
(3) The buyer or the courts adjust the contract price P upwards by cu.
In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, had Kent discovered the pipe substitution at the time it occurred, then
he could have asked for immediate action. In that case, given that the cost of compliance would
have been relatively low, Jacob & Youngs would have been obliged to comply. More generally, the
COD ensures that the buyer is able to obtain necessary changes in a timely fashion. This in turn
reduces the cost of construction, while still providing the seller with protection. We now turn to the
more difficult case of foreseen components where the contract must provide appropriate incentives
for investment into cost reduction.
24See Atkins and Simpson (2006) for a discussion of the issues.
25This right to confiscate is also consistent with Oliver Hart’s observation that authority also includes control over
physical assets — see Hart (1995), page 58.
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Buyer Biased Components. Consider now a component that is foreseen to be part of the project,
and for which there is a chance of a design change. For example, the buyer might wish to change a
paint color, or the location of an outlet. Clause 4.2.8 of A201 gives the right to the buyer/architect
to carry out minor changes at no penalty. We call this contractual instrument changes within the
scope of the project or CS:
CS: Changes within the Scope:
(1) If tc is buyer biased and foreseen, then the buyer may, with no price consequence, select any
qc ∈ {0, 1} as long as the change is both minor and within the scope of the project.
This has two effects. Given the design, the sellers can anticipate this behavior, and thus increase
their bids for projects that have a high probability of design change. This in turn provides an
incentive to the buyer to invest in design. When design is of high quality, then the seller does not
expect a large number of design changes ex post, and he correspondingly makes a greater relationship
specific investment into cost reduction. Second, since design changes have no effect on price, the
buyer now selects her preferred change, which is efficient given that the component is buyer biased.
Thus, we have:
Proposition 5. If a buyer biased component is governed by the contractual instrument CS, then
the seller chooses effort e at the efficient level conditional upon design d, and hence the lowest cost
of production conditional upon d is achieved.
Under CS there is no price consequence for the buyer’s choice, and therefore, ex post, the buyer
chooses her preferred design. Given that the component is buyer biased, this is also the efficient
choice ex post. The expected payoff of the seller at the time effort is chosen is:
US(e|d) = P − ρ(d) {ρ(e)cL + (1− ρ(e))cH} −
(1− ρ(d))cˆ− e
= P + (F (d) + 1) {(F (e) + 1)∆c− cH} /2−
(1− F (d))cˆ/2− e.
If one compares this expression with the social surplus in (3.2), one can see that ∂U
S
∂e =
∂SB
∂e ,
and hence under CS the seller will choose the level of effort that maximizes social surplus. This
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result, given that the buyer is a residual claimant, implies that design is chosen at the efficient level
whenever CS is included in contract k for buyer biased components.
Note that this contract clause is quite different from the fixed price contract typically studied in
the literature, as in Hart and Moore (1988). The typical assumption is that the contract specifies
both price and quantity, with changes in either corresponding to contract breach. This clause is
equivalent to allowing the buyer to make a unilateral change in the quantity, and face no penalty.
As long as the seller can anticipate the likelihood of this change, then allowing changes within the
scope of the project ensures efficient investment into cost reduction. If one enforced the contract
at the specified quantity, then under expectation damages the buyer would have to compensate the
seller for any cost consequence. This would result in over-investment in design, as Rogerson (1984)
has shown.
Thus, the AIA contracts’ inclusion of a term that allows minor changes to design at no cost
is not merely a convenience that reduces the costs of renegotiation, it also induces efficient effort
into cost reduction and design. A testable implication of this proposition is that one would expect,
conditional upon job characteristics, bids for home improvement projects done without the aid of
an architect to be higher than for projects with an architect, since they are likely to need more
changes ex post.
Seller Biased Components. Consider now the case of a seller biased component that has the feature
that it is always optimal to carry out the less expensive design. This would be a feature of compo-
nents that do not impinge upon the aesthetic qualities of the final project. For example, the design
might call for pipes to be in a particular location behind a wall - yet it may be less expensive to
deviate from the plan. In addition, the contract might not specify exactly how the project would
be executed, even though the buyer may care about this.
In these cases, it is efficient to deviate from the default rule that gives the buyer overall control of
the project. There are other cases that are simply errors in execution. Such defects are effectively
choices by the seller (even if inadvertent) that depend upon how closely employees are monitored.
If the defect is major then under section 12 of A201-1997, consistent with the principle that the
buyer has control, the seller is expected to correct it at his own cost.
However, section 12.3 explicitly allows the buyer to accept non-conforming work, combined with
a reduction in the contract price. If parties cannot agree upon a price reduction, then courts would
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set the reduction equal to its best estimate of the loss in value to the buyer. Formally, article 12.3
of A201-1997 corresponds to the following contractual instrument:
BRR: Buyer remediation rights - if the seller alters the design, then the buyer should be
compensated by an amount equal to the loss in anticipated use value.
The open issue is exactly how one should determine the anticipated use value. Suppose that when
the seller decides to set q = 0, a penalty of l is paid to the buyer. In that case the expected utility
of the seller is:
US(d, e) = P − ρ(d) {ρ(e)cL + (1− ρ(e))(cˆ+ l)}
− (1− ρ(d)) {ρ(e)cL + (1− ρ(e))(cˆ+ l)} − e.
From this expression we can derive the seller’s first order condition for effort under the hypothesis
that the buyer has chosen design efficiently:
F ′(e∗) =
2
∆c+ l
. (4.2)
Comparing (3.7) with (4.2) it follows that the seller will choose efficient investment if l = F (d∗)∆u.
Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 6. For seller biased components (∆c > ∆u) the contractual instrument BRR induces
the efficient implementation of a component when the damages, l, for a design change by the seller
are equal to the harm to the buyer, ∆u, times the foreseeability of planning, F (d∗).
We have assumed throughout the paper that the preferences of the buyer are neither observed
by the seller, nor by the courts. Hence, to achieve an efficient allocation, the buyer would have to
specify in advance the damages to be paid. If these are not specified in advance, then we are in
a situation where the courts may be asked to set the appropriate damages. In section 4, we show
that this rule is consistent with several existing common law damage rules.
While Proposition 6 provides general conditions under which one obtains the efficient implemen-
tation of seller biased components, it suffers from the problem that the courts must measure the
harm to the buyer. One can avoid such costly litigation if there were no liability. This is the case
when:
l = F (d∗)∆u = 0. (4.3)
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This condition is satisfied when design has no effect upon the buyer’s preferences, or when there is
no investment into design. For example, the methods that the seller uses to implement the design
should be of no concern to the buyer. In fact, if a seller has a superior construction method, the
buyer would obtain a lower bid if she allows the seller to use such a method. This is reflected in
clause 3.3.1 of the AIA form A201-1997:
“The Contractor shall be solely responsible for and have control over construction
means, methods, techniques and procedures and for coordinating all portions of
the Work under the Contract, unless the Contract Documents give other specific
instructions concerning these matters.”
Thus, the buyer does not have the right to directly control the employees of the contractor, and
hence the construction relationship is not a form of employment relationship. Furthermore, under
section 5 of A201-1997 the seller has the right to hire subcontractors subject to approval by the
owner. We denote this contractual instrument by:
SCR: Seller Control Rights - the seller may change the design or execution of components
that have no impact upon buyer welfare (∆u = 0).
This instrument, combined with the buyer’s right to make changes to the design clearly illustrates
that the AIA form contracts split control rights.
Summary. A complex project is in practice built up from a large number of specialized components
that contribute in different ways to the overall value of the project. We have shown that it is
optimal to tailor contract terms, including the allocation of control rights, to the characteristics of
the components in a project. Together, these contract terms of contractual instruments ensure the
efficient implementation of a complex project. We have shown that each contractual instrument has
an analogue in the American Institute of Architects form construction contracts, as summarized in
the table 1.
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Table 1. Contractual Instruments
Contractual Instrument Period Enforced Goal
A310 - Bid Bond ex ante Ensure seller does not renege on winning bid.
A312 - Payment Bond ex post Ensure sub-contractors are paid.
A312 - Performance Bond ex post Ensure project is completed if seller cannot perform.
A210-7.2 - Change Order interim Ensure that seller makes requested changes at cost.
A210-7.3 - Change Order Directive interim Obliges seller to make change.
A210-7.4 - Minor Changes interim Minor modifications create no change in price.
A210-3.3.1 - Seller Control interim Seller has right to organize production.
A210-12.3 - Remediation ex post Buyer can accept price reduction for non-conforming design.
For the most part these clauses have clear meanings, and hence whether or not there has been a
breach of contract is clear. In some cases, as with the remediation clause (A210-12.3), parties may
not agree regarding whether there has been a breach, and what are the remedies if there has been
breach. We address these issues in the next section.
5. Ex Post: Remedies for Contract Breach
In contrast to what is typically assumed in economics, if parties have entered into an agreement
with clear and verifiable terms, this does not imply that the contract is enforceable.26 This can
only be determined by an actual court case. The American Institute of Architects has published a
compendium of court cases involving contract disputes (see Stein (2001)). From these, one can learn
whether or not a particular contract clause would be enforced as agreed. Court cases can also clarify
the meaning of text when it can have several interpretations. The AIA form construction contracts
are carefully constructed to take into account these legal decisions, and are modified regularly in
light of legal developments.
In this section, we discuss some actual court cases to illustrate how contracts are enforced in
practice. We show that the optimal remediation rule, l = F (d) ×∆u, can be viewed as a default
rule that encompasses several well known legal doctrines. We consider in turn the enforcement of
the authority relationship, the choice between specific performance and expectation damages, and
finally, rules that limit legal liability.
26The enforceability problem is not limited to construction contracts. For example, the courts will not enforce a
contract in which a patient, prior to receiving medical treatment, agrees not to sue a health care provider for medical
malpractice that may occur during the treatment. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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Authority. The authority provided by change orders and change directives in AIA form contracts is
very different from the standard assumption one makes in contract theory. To see this, suppose that
a buyer and seller have agreed upon a contract to exchange q0 units of a good at a price P 0. Further
suppose that this requires significant relationship specific investment by the buyer (for example, the
buyer might be a utility, who has built a train line to the mine supplying coal). Suppose that the
buyer would like to increase the amount purchased. Models that allow for renegotiation, such as
Hart and Moore (1988) or Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994), suppose the contract (q0, P 0) acts
as a default for renegotiation, with the buyer and seller sharing any rents that arise from contract
renegotiation.
Most importantly, under this contract the seller would have the right to refuse to increase sup-
ply. However, the authority relationship in the AIA form contract gives the right to the buyer to
unilaterally change the quantity specified, say to q1. Moreover, the cost of this must be equal to the
seller’s marginal cost of increasing supply. In practice, supply contracts may have clauses that allow
for changes in the quantity. In construction, one cannot always anticipate whether the design will
be changed, and hence these contracts implement procedures to regulate the renegotiation process.
Change orders and change directives address this by providing the buyer with the unilateral right
to change the design at cost. This right was affirmed in Karz v. Department of Professional and
Vocational Standards (1936), 11 CA 2d 554, in which the owner and the contractor did not agree
on the price for the extra work but the contractor was required to perform the extra work or be
considered in breach of contract. Specifically, the judge in this case ruled:
“Where a contractor refuses to complete a building when the owners thereof refuse
to pay for “extras” as they orally agreed, and the oral contract for “extras” is an
independent covenant that does not go to the whole consideration of the written
contract for the erection of the building, but is subordinate and incidental to its
main purpose, the breach by the owners of said oral contract does not constitute a
breach of the entire contract, and does not warrant a rescission of the entire contract
by the contractor, whose only remedy for the breach is compensation in damages.”
As we have shown above, the allocation of authority to the buyer is efficient because it provides
first best incentives to the buyer to reveal her true preferences. This right is not a general right
that applies to all buyers. For example, the lead contractor is often responsible for the hiring and
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supervision of subcontractors. Moreover, these subcontractors may be asked to carry out additional
work under a change directive. As a matter of law, the subcontractor is not obliged to carry out
the work without an agreement regarding payment.
In Framingham Heavy Equipment v. Callahan & Sons (2004), 61 Mass. App.Ct. 171, 807
N.E.2d 851, the subcontractor, Framingham Heavy Equipment, refused to complete work on a school
building until they had received payment for extra work carried out under a change directive. In
this case, the courts ruled that in refusing to complete the work due to non-payment they had not
breached the contract, and that in fact Callahan & Sons had breached by not making installment
payments for the work as it proceeded. This case illustrates that the buyer has authority over the
contractor, but not over subcontractors. This is consistent with the subcontractors making few
relationship specific investments, and being called in on the job as needed.
These cases illustrate that the courts do enforce agreements, and moreover, the authority rela-
tionship that exists between the buyer and lead contractor on a construction project is enforceable.
We now move on to those cases where the courts are less deferential to the text of the contract.
Specific Performance versus Expectation Damages. The allocation of authority allows one
party to make decisions during the execution of the project that have the force of law, and hence in
most situations are respected by the other party. In practice, if there is a disagreement and a case
is litigated it arrives in court long after the project has been completed or abandoned. In that case,
the question before the courts is not the enforcement of the contract per se, but the determination
of damages. The standard rule is expectation damages, namely compensating the harmed party for
the losses that occurred due to the breach of contract.
A very controversial question is whether or not the courts should use the rule of specific perfor-
mance as a measure of damages.27 By this one means providing the harmed party with sufficient
funds that they can in fact have the contract terms executed. Most economic models of contract
implicitly or explicitly suppose, as in Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994), that the courts use
specific performance. In this section, we discuss two famous cases in which it would seem that
specific performance is the natural remedy, but in which the courts awarded much smaller expecta-
tion damages. These decisions are very controversial because they are interpreted as undermining
27See Schwartz (1979) for example.
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the ability of parties to write binding contracts. However, one can show that these decisions are
consistent with efficient procurement in our model.
The first case is Jacob & Youngs Inc. v. George E. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921). In this case,
Kent hired Jacob & Youngs to build a house that included the requirement that all the wrought iron
water pipe used in the house be manufactured by Reading Co. After the completion of construction,
Kent learned that some of the pipe was of a different brand, and hence Jacob & Youngs had clearly
not performed as required in the contract. The contract also specified that the final payment of
$3,483.46 to Jacob & Youngs be conditional upon the successful completion of the project. Given
the evident breach, Kent refused to make this payment unless the contractor replaced the pipes
with the ones specified in the contract.
Jacob and Youngs refused to make the changes because the pipes that were installed were of a
quality that was equivalent to those manufactured by Reading Co and hence it made no economic
sense to tear up the walls to replace the pipes. As a consequence, Jacob & Youngs felt justified in
suing Kent for the final payment. At trial Jacob & Youngs were barred from submitting evidence
regarding the quality of the replacement pipes, and the judge ruled for Kent.
Upon appeal, Justice Cardozo ruled that Jacob & Youngs had indeed breached the contract, but
that the damage was negligible, and hence, Kent was obliged to make the final payment to Jacob
& Youngs. The decision was very controversial, with three judges dissenting. The dissenting judges
felt that since this ruling would have the force of law, it would undermine the ability of parties to
write enforceable (and hence efficient) contracts.28
In our model, we show that this decision is consistent with efficient contract enforcement. First,
in terms of damages, if the contractor carries out non-conforming work then the optimal rule is to
set damages equal to F (d)∆u. In this case design is foreseeable, and hence F (d) = 1. Given that
the pipes called for in the design were equivalent in quality to the pipes installed, then ∆u = 0, so
that damages should be nominal, as in the ruling by Cardozo.
There is an additional reason why this ruling is efficient that relates to the division of authority
between the buyer and seller. The court documents reveal that one reason Kent did not make
the final payment was a result of a general dissatisfaction with the work of Jacob & Youngs.29
28The court consisted of seven judges with Hiscock, Hogan and Crance, concurring with Cardozo, while Pound and
Andrews concurred with McLaughlin, the judge who wrote the dissenting opinion.
29See the discussion in Danzig (1978), page 120.
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The project was not completed on time, and there were some minor details that needed correction
after the completion of construction. Thus, in essence Kent was motivated to use the technical
requirement that the pipes be of the Reading brand to justify the non-payment. Given that Kent
was not substantially harmed by the change of pipe brands, and did not plan to change the pipes,
the non-payment could be viewed as opportunistic behavior in the sense of Williamson (1975).
One can view the SCR, or the seller control rights contractual instrument as a solution to oppor-
tunistic behavior by the buyer. During production a seller may take shortcuts, either inadvertent
or consciously, that lower costs in a ways that have a minimal impact upon buyer welfare. In cases
such as Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, the buyer may attempt to use the existence of a technical breach
of contract to extract rents out of proportion with the harm. If the courts were to support such
behavior then it would lead to higher costs ex ante, and less efficient contracts.
However, there are cases where the non-enforcement of specific performance seems very problem-
atic. A good example is the well known case of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal, 382 P.2d 109, 114
(Okla.1962). In this case, the Peevyhouses were a farming couple who entered into an agreement
with Garland Coal Co. to allow strip mining upon their land. As a condition of the contract, the
Peevyhouses insisted that the land be regraded upon completion of the mining operations. The coal
company breached this term in the contract, with the consequence that the Peevyhouses sued them
for an amount of $25,000. This amount was less than the estimated cost of remediation of about
$29,000.
It is worthwhile to observe that the Peevyhouses crossed out a term in the agreement that would
have allowed Garland not to regrade the land in exchange for damages of $5,000.30 Hence, the
agreement clearly stated that Garland had an obligation to repair the land. As in Jacob & Youngs
v. Kent, the issue was not whether there had been a breach of contract, but what the appropriate
damages should be. The lower court awarded $5,000 rather than the $25,000. Upon appeal, the
court found that the reduction in value of the land from not grading was $300, and hence the
damages were reduced from $5,000 to $300!
The case was very controversial because the courts refused to enforce a clear contract condition.
As Maute (1995) discusses, there was also a hint of impropriety because there appeared to be a
relationship between one of the judges and the law firm representing Garland Coal. This case has
30See Maute (1995).
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generated a great deal of legal scholarship on the question of what the courts should have done. For
parties who write contracts, this question is moot. Their concern is with writing a contract that is
enforceable given the way the courts behave in practice. This is one goal of the AIA forms.
The AIA forms, specifically form A312, provide a solution via the performance bond. These
bonds ensure that should the seller default, then the bonding company or surety will step in and
hire another supplier if necessary. It is worth emphasizing that the role of the surety is quite different
from that of the courts. The court merely awards damages based upon a measure of expectations,
while the surety completes the construction of the project. This is possible because the surety is
a company that specializes in the provision of such services, and hence is able to supervise the
completion of a construction process. They price bonds as a function of the past performance of
the seller purchasing the bond.
Should the surety not perform, given that the financial liability is clearly specified, the application
of expectation damages is straightforward, and would in general equal the cost of completion or the
limit on the bond, what ever is smaller. In Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co., if the contract
had included a bonding provision, then grading, up to the limits of the bond, would have been
enforceable. In this case, the bond itself provides a measure of expectation damages since it would
clearly specify that the buyer should be compensated for the cost of project completion up to
some well defined limit. In contrast, Garland Coal breached a duty to returns good in a certain
condition, for which the standard award is set equal to expectation damages when there are no
liquidated damages.
If Kent, in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, had wished to have Reading pipe for reasons other than
the transport of water, then the contract should have included an explicit penalty class for non-
performance. Given that the courts in the US will not enforce stipulated damages that are deemed
unreasonable, the buyer would also have to explain why the brand of pipe is so important. In that
case, if the seller were to default and install a different brand, the courts again need only apply
the rule of expectation damages, where the damages are measured by the stipulated penalty for
non-performance.
Schwartz and Scott (2008) observe that the AIA bonding contract allows the surety to be excused
by paying an amount equal to the damages caused by the contractor. This, they argue, implies that
even this instrument would not allow parties to ensure performance in US courts, and specifically
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would not do so in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent. However, this rule is not as general as one might think.
For instance, in Kangas v. Trust 31, the contractor built a house with a basement ceiling that was
several inches lower than that called for in the plans. The Trusts sued for damages equal to the
cost of lowering the basement floor. In the end, rather than occupy the house, the house was sold.
It was established that the ceiling height did not adversely affect the sale price. Under Schwartz
and Scott’s interpretation of Jacob & Youngs v. Kent this would imply that the Trusts would not
be awarded any damages for the reduced ceiling height. The courts accepted the evidence that the
contract specified that the height of the basement was an important ingredient of the design, and
accordingly awarded the Trusts the costs of remediation. This result is consistent with the BRR
(buyer remediation rights) rights clause found in the AIA forms.32
Unforeseeable Events, Mistakes and Impossibility. There are several legal default rules that
deal with events that are unforeseen at the time an agreement regarding a contract is reached. The
first of these limit liability to damages that are foreseen, as established in the famous case of Hadley
v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Exch 341.
In Hadley v. Baxendale, the court ruled that liability should be limited to losses arising “according
to the usual course of things” or losses that “have been in contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.” The Hadley brothers, owners of
City Flour Mills, wanted a broken shaft to be shipped by Pickford & Company, a common carrier, of
which Baxendale was the managing director. The shaft was to be sent to Joyce & Co., Greenwich,
manufacturers of the mill’s steam engine. The broken shaft was supposed to be a model for a new
shaft without which the mill could not operate. The shaft, which was supposed to be delivered by
May 15, 1854, was not delivered until May 21. Baxendale was not informed about the high value
of the product to Hadley, and therefore Baxendale did not take special precaution to ensure an
on-time delivery. Hadley then sued Baxendale for the lost profits due to the delivery delay.
The court held that Baxendale was not liable for Hadley’s lost profits since the loss was due to
unusual circumstances, and that the damages to Hadley were unforeseen by Baxendale. In this case,
it was agreed that the damages due to the late delivery, ∆u = u(1, 1)− u(0, 1), were large, possibly
larger than the cost of taking action to avoid late delivery. However, these losses were unforeseen
31110 Ill.App.3d 876, 441 N.E.2d 1271, Ill.App. 2 Dist.,1982.
32Specifically the judge ruled: “since damage arose from a willful violation of the building contract and since basement
height was of “special value” to homeowners, owners could recover $20,000 from builder for fact that basement was
four inches shorter than contracted for rather than diminution in value of the house.”
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by Baxendale. Our liability rule explicitly models the degree of foreseeability with F (d). When an
event is unforeseen, F (d) = 0, then the damages due are l = F (d∗)∆u = 0, a result that is consistent
with Hadley v. Baxendale.33 Moreover, this result generalizes the analysis of Ayres and Gertner
(1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) to the case of partial foreseeability when F (d∗) > 0.
This damage formula is also consistent the mistake doctrine. If an error in the contract leads
to faulty performance or if the contracting parties have differing understandings of the transaction,
then non-performance may be excused, as in Mannix v. Tryon (1907), 152 Cal. 31. Here the court
found that the decolorization of a building arose due to the specifications in the contract about the
method used to mix plaster, and as a consequence the contractor was not held liable for the defect.
In McConnell v. Corona City Water Co. (1906), 149 Cal. 60 the contractor was excused for the
collapse of the tunnel because the contractor had followed the design given by defective drawings.
In each of these cases, the harm was significant, but the design was inadequate. This corresponds
to F (d) = 0, and thus according to our rule no liability for the seller.
6. Discussion
The economics of contract theory is concerned with explaining the structure of a contract given
the constraints imposed by transactions costs. Despite the many recent advances, Tirole (1999)
has observed that there remains a significant gap between the theory and the evidence. This paper
contributes to the closing of this gap with a model that is designed to explain the structure of the
form construction contracts sold by the American Institute of Architects. These contracts, and
contracts quite similar to them in form, are widely used in the construction industry to allocated
billions of dollars of resources. Within the context of our model, we show that the optimal contract
is a collection of contractual instruments or modules - clauses that are tailored to specific events
that may occur at different stages of the project.
Moreover, these clauses not only specify the obligations for each party, they also regulate the
renegotiation of contract terms in the face of new information, including the allocation of decision
making authority to the party who has the information most relevant to the decision at hand. Each
of these instruments have analogues in the American Institute of Architects (AIA) form construction
contracts. For example, the bid bond, the change order instrument and the change order directive
33We model unforeseeability as there being an equal chance of one of two events occurring. This idea generalizes to
more events, and simply captures the idea that the seller will not invest in lowering costs if he does not know which
of several possible actions is the most efficient action.
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are specifically designed to increase the bargaining power of the buyer. There also exist some
countervailing instruments that ensure that sellers recover their costs. Together, these observations
illustrate how observed contracts that rely upon the legal rule of expectation damages can use the
allocation of authority to efficiently implement complex projects.
The AIA form contracts themselves are not static. They have evolved over one hundred years
in response to industry experience and court rulings. This illustrates that contracts are themselves
complex products that are subject to innovation and change. Thus, it is not surprising that parties
who write contracts without the benefit of experience or hindsight are likely to make errors. In
these cases, the courts may be called upon to adjudicate disputes involving these poorly crafted
agreements. Our model is consistent with the hypothesis that the courts in the United States (and in
some case the United Kingdom) have evolved efficient default rules in these cases.34 Specifically, we
show that the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale limiting damages to those that are foreseen, the doctrines
of impossibility and mistake that excuse the breaching party from performance are optimal.
This analysis is only a starting point for a fuller investigation into how the law can shape the form
of observed contracts. Our results show that the rule of expectation damages does not necessary
contrain the efficiency of observed agreement. However, we do not provide a general theory of
why the rule has its current form. Such as theory should explain the enormous variation across
countries in the way courts adjudicate contract disputes (see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
and Shleifer (2003)). It is likely that some legal systems are more efficient than others, but such a
statement is extremely difficult to evaluate in practice given the wide disparity in local conditions.
Though we have shown that the AIA form construction contracts in the US can be viewed as an
efficient solution to the problem of implementing complex trade, it is not clear if these forms would
be efficient in other jurisdictions, especially in cases where, as discussed in Johnson, McMillan, and
Woodruff (2002), parties have increased reliance upon informal enforcement. We need a great deal
of further work to understand the complex interplay between contract form, transactions costs, and
the limits of legal enforcement.
Appendix A. Proof of Propositions
First, a preliminary lemma.
34This is consistent with Posner (2003)’s view that American common law has evolved an efficient solution to the
problem of adjudicating disputes.
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Lemma. The functions SB(d, e,∆c,∆u) and SS(d, e,∆c,∆u) are supermodular in (d, e) on [0,∞)2×
(0,∞)2.
Proof. Observe that
SB(d, e) = u(0, 0)− cˆ+ (F (d)F (e)∆c) /2 + F (d)∆u¯/2 + (∆u¯+ F (e)∆c) /2− d− e.
From Corollary 2.6.3 of Topkis (1998), we have that F (d)F (e)∆c and F (e)∆c are supermodular.
Since SB is a linear combination of supermodular functions, then, by Lemma 2.6.1 of Topkis (1998),
it follows that SB is supermodular. Similarly, SS is supermodular. 
This lemma greatly simplifies the proofs of the propositions because it implies that investments are
complements and hence increasing or decreasing together when we change the exogenous parameters
∆u and ∆c from theorem 2.8.1 of Topkis (1998).
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. If F ′(0) < 24u∗+4c , then using F
′′ < 0, we get d∗ = 0 regardless of the level of e∗. Next,
F ′(0) < 24u∗+4c <
2
4c , which implies that e
∗ = 0.
If 14c ≥ F ′(0) > 24u∗ , then e∗ = 0 for all values of d∗, implying that F (e∗) = 0. Then
2
4u∗+F (e∗)4c =
2
4u∗ < F
′(0), which by concavity of F gives d∗ > 0.
If F ′(0) > max( 24c ,
2
4u∗ ), then, by concavity of F , e
∗ > 0 regardless of d∗ and d∗ > 0 regardless
of e∗. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. This is similar to proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3: In the second price auction with independent values it is well know that
it is a dominant strategy to bid a price that ensures that one gets one’s reservation value for the
project, USi . Given that only the fixed investment varies between sellers, then the low cost seller
wins the auction and earns a rent δ = |AS1 −AS2 |. Given that the rent is independent of the buyer’s
contracts, then the buyer will choose the contract k ∈ K, and design, d, that solves
maxk∈K,d≥0,i∈IE(Si(ω, d, e∗(k, d))|k,D).
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Proof of Proposition 4: For unforeseen components the price of completion is set equal to the
observable cost, cu, and thus under COI the buyer will add the task if and only uu ≥ cu. If e = 0
is efficient, this implies by the complementarity of design and cost reduction that it is efficient to
set d = 0. Hence, there is no ex ante gain from a contract, and it follows that COI efficiently
implements this component.
Proof of Proposition 6: From the seller’s pay off the first order condition is given by
F ′(e∗) =
2
(∆c+ l)
where l is the penalty paid by the seller for the change of component produced. If l = F (d∗)∆u,
then F ′(e∗) = (2/(∆c+ F (d∗)∆u)), and thus BRR implements the efficient allocation.
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